

then in the process of setting up a District Intelligence and Operations Coordinating Center (DIOCC) under the control of the Phoenix program. This was a joint American-Vietnamese venture aimed at identifying and then "neutralizing" -- either through imprisonment, assassination or forced defection -- local members of the Viet Cong infrastructure, known as VCI" .

In Quang Ngai at the same time, one of the largest military intelligence nets was gathering information of both combat and political nature. The priority on quantity of information was so great as to ignore most checks on the accuracy of information submitted. As a result, the second major problem of the escalation of Phoenix was felt: the amount of raw information -- names, places, dates, organizations, plans -- reported by these agents became uncontrollable. So did the number of agents in nets such as the one in Quang Ngai. The agent handler found this situation out of control, and when finally pressed to diagram his net for the approval of the 525th Military Intelligence Group in Saigon, he found that the net diagram covered one entire wall of his battalion headquarters in Danang. Reflecting their exasperation at the mercenary approach of those reporting, and in typical lack of sensitivity to this appalling situation, the people of the MI battalion nicknamed the entire agent net "Ali Baba and his forty thieves".

Many similarly overgrown apparatuses led to the inevitable US solution to the growing problem of dealing with the mere paper load of the VCI neutralization program. In the summer of 1968, the names in the Phoenix store were computerized, in a desperate attempt to control the endless lists. With this computerization and the resultant software store, a monster was born -- unique to the age of the Vietnam war -- which would have in another time served the administration of the Third Reich's final solution to the "Jewish problem". Because it was computed at that time, the official US and GVN documents which refer to Phoenix mark its date of inception at August 1, 1968. This is obviously inaccurate, as is shown in the

above reference to My Lai 4. However, by the spring of 1970, the mass of files on NLF suspects had grown as large as to stimulate directives advising the disposal of "VCI" at the local province level. A GVN directive dated 24 April 70 states: "It has been specified in Annex II of the 1970 Pacification and Development Plan that local authorities must provide an accurate solution to two-thirds of the total number of VCI's arrested monthly so as to preclude backlog of cases in local areas."

This has long been understood by the Vietnamese local authorities in the South to constitute authority for these detainees' murder. As we will see later, US personnel were directed in the late fall of 1971 -- after Congressional inquiry brought attention to the Phoenix program -- to disassociate from direct involvement in assassination procedures, and to ask for reassignment if anyone might "object to participation in the program". However, the training provided the US personnel who have been responsible for the murderous *modus operandi*, understand fully that the US government simply uses such directives to assert that while the administration of the Phoenix program is necessary, it must be voluntary on the part of the advisor. This no news to a CIA mercenary, nor to a Foreign Service Officer, grade #1 (full ambassador), whose career training programs require that each be "functionally knowledgeable" in the techniques and necessity of espionage and torture as they are employed in counterinsurgent efforts.

But what efforts have been made to stop this authorized "neutralization" program sponsored and nurtured by the US mission in Saigon? Aside from statements of former Phoenix workers who had spoken out publicly about the awesome facts, the subject was only briefly examined in testimony taken by the House Subcommittee on Foreign Operations and Government Information in July and August of 1971. At that time, Ambassador William E. Colby (former director of Phoenix in RVN) came before the committee and swore under oath that Phoenix was a respectable

program aimed at eliminating a practical problem -- the VC infrastructure. When questioned concerning the unaccounted-for 1.7 billion dollars which had financed much of the covert aspect of Phoenix (agent payments, PRU equipment, etc.), Ambassador Colby assured the committee that, while Phoenix was less than well-controlled at its "early stages" (referring to the pre-computer days), all the main problems had been resolved and that the Congress could rest assured that aberrations of brutality would remain at a minimum. No, he did not know how many innocent victims the program had killed, maybe 5,000, maybe more. No, he did not have the authority to discuss the reasons why the Congress could not audit 1.7 billion dollars' worth of taxpayers funds which went to CORDS. This is as close to the truth as the Congress has ever come. (see insert)

The significance of the above testimony, however, is not that a high-ranking official has misled Congress. Rather the fact that the laws, directives and practices of what was until 1971 actively known as the Phoenix Program have not been repealed. In fact, the only change which has been made in the continuing policy of VCI neutralization is, like all other covert operations, that its cover name has been changed. The program has been re-designated, and now takes its name from the rating given to the least verifiable type of intelligence information which justifies VCI neutralization. The name of the program is now "F-6". In an attempt to call attention to the fact that, among other crimes, Phoenix and F-6 have now generated close to 300,000 political prisoners in the South Vietnamese prisons, a member of the GVN House of Deputies, Ho Ngoc Nhuan, wrote in a Jan. 18, 1973 article that:

"A new program, with only the name of F-6, is being secretly installed to replace the (US) CIA-organized Phoenix program, discontinued recently. Like its predecessor, the new program is aimed at "neutralizing" suspected Viet Cong cadre and sympathizers.

"Suspects, under F-6, can now be arrested for an immense range of reasons, and the accusation of one person is enough for capture. Individuals and families who might, in the past, have had some contact with "the other side", perhaps only a relative in the North or in the NLF, are now under suspicion.

There is hardly a family in the South free from "taint", including the highest ranking government officials. Even Thieu's own people are complaining privately about F-6 which hangs over everyone's head like a guillotine."

Two first-hand accounts of torture and brutality have recently been published by Jean-Pierre Debris and Andre Menras, two French schoolteachers who had been arrested and imprisoned under Phoenix/F-6 authority in July of 1970. Tortured and kept at Chi Hoa prison for two and a half years, Debris and Menras were fin-

WE DEMAND WILLIAM E. COLBY'S RESIGNATION

Ambassador William E. Colby, in his role as Director of the US Cords mission in Vietnam, headed the Phoenix Program at the height of US ground troop involvement. Under his direction, Phoenix agents practiced some of their most brutal forms of assassination and torture.

Under oath before the House Subcommittee on Foreign Operations and Government Information, Ambassador Colby lied concerning the nature of the Phoenix Program and misrepresented its cost in both number of victims and amount of mis-used public funds. As a reward for his having been the CIA's apologist for Phoenix, Mr. Colby has recently been appointed the CIA's Deputy Director of Operations (clandestine services -- an office which constitutes 60% of the CIA's total operations).

CARIC feels that a man who, like the fabled Old Man of the Mountain, has had a career of directing assassination and torture programs can play no legitimate part in US government. We encourage all citizens to write their Congressional representative, the White House and the Central Intelligence Agency to demand his resignation.

ally released in late December of 1972, after their plight was brought to the attention of the French people who in turn put the pressure of public outrage on the French government and obtained the two's release. Their view if "F-6" is that: "the idea that F-6 will yield less than the hundreds of thousands of victim which Phoenix did is naive, and probably very underestimated..."

It is important to examine the arrest procedure which allows such people as the above Frenchmen to be included in

the insane pursuit of "political prisoners". Whoever falls into the Phoenix/F-6 process goes through a local version of this general picture:

- The suspect is either arrested on a military sweep or by specific fingering by an informant, or in the streets by the National Police.
- Once detained, the suspect loses all access to the legal system. With no right to be heard, he is assumed guilty of treason.
- Judged by the local committee whose job is already complicated by the priority directive to dispose of two-thirds of the detainees at the local level, the detainee becomes legally impotent in his incarceration.
- If there is not enough evidence to convict the detainee, he is brought before a Provincial Security Committee and may be imprisoned for two years, at which time his sentence is renewable.

The criteria for suspicion and arrest under F-6 are clearly stated in South Vietnamese law, to be as all-inclusive as possible; and this explains the worry among Thieu's people which was referred to above. The law reads as follows:

"Residents of the area who make suspicious utterances, such as, (1) expressions which distort the Government of Vietnam policies and the action of the Government of Vietnam cadres; (2) false rumors which confuse and frighten the people; (3) creation of division and hatred among the populace and between the populace and the cadres of the Government of Vietnam.

"Those who act suspiciously:

- (a) the hesitation or fearful attitude of a dishonest person;*
- (b) contact with those whom we suspect; or*
- (c) regular secret colloquies of a certain group of people in the area.*

Such are the facts of continued repression and US-sponsored brutality and murder within the current practices of the GVN. As the early Phung Hoang program and later Phoenix were covertly run under the guise of Civil Operations,

Rural Development Support (CORDS), so is the new F-6 program run covertly under its guise -- that of the office of the Special Assistant to the Ambassador for Field Operations (SAAFFO), which is the cover organization through which the US mission will again fund and advise the murder programs of the Thieu government.

CARIC remains concerned that, after years of operation to the demise of countless innocent Vietnamese civilians, pacification and neutralization programs continue to be sponsored by the American citizenry. Only through the continued exposure of the facts will there be the possibility of correcting this abominable and illegal situation.


Due to space limitations, CARIC is unable to provide a bibliography in this issue. A complete bibliography of the more than 100 books, periodicals, articles and unclassified government documents used in preparing this summary of pacification in Vietnam and our analysis of Phoenix/F-6 is available from CARIC's Intelligence Documentation Center (IDC). Copies of Phoenix support documents are available from CARIC. For information write to CARIC/IDC.

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British Advisor Returns to Saigon

CARIC has recently learned that Sir Robert G. K. Thompson, who served as an advisor to early pacification techniques and programs, dating back to the 1950's, has recently returned to Saigon to assist the GVN during the coming era of the "F-6" program.

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


ACRONYMS

ADP - Automatic Data Processing
 AID - US Agency for International Development
 APT - Armed Propaganda Team
 ARVN - Armed Forces Viet Nam
 BAM - British Advisory Team; Thompson
 CAS - Chief At Station SAIGON; CIA field unit
 CAP - Combined Action Platoon
 CIA - US Central Intelligence Agency
 CIDG - Civilian Irregular Defense Group
 CIS - GVN Central Intelligence Service
 CORDS - Civil Operations and Revolutionary Support
 COMUSMACV - Commander US Military Assistance Command Vietnam
 CTZ - Corps Tactical Zone; region
 DGNP - Directorate General National Police
 FEC - French Expeditionary Corps
 FWMAF - Free World Military Armed Forces
 GAMO - Groupes Administrative Mobile Organization
 GVN - Saigon government

HES - Hamlet Evaluation System
 JUSPAO - Joint US Public Affairs Office
 LLDB - Luc Luong Dac Biet; Special Forces
 MACV - Military Assistance Command Viet Nam
 MLG - Mission Liaison Group; Lansdale
 MSS - Military Security Service
 NTRP - National Identification Registration Program
 NLF - National Liberation Force
 NP - National Police
 NPFF - National Police Field Force
 OCO - Office of Civil Operations
 PAT - Pacification Action Team
 PIC - Province Interiqation Center
 PIOCC - Province Intelligence Operations Coordination Center
 PSC - Province Security Committee
 PRG - Provisional Revolutionary Government
 RCP - Resources Control Program
 RF/PF - Regional Forces/Popular Forces
 RVMAF - Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces
 SAAFFA - Special Assistant to the Amb. for Field Operations
 SDC - Self Defense Corp
 SP - Special Police branch
 SMPD - Saigon Metropolitan Police Directorate
 VCI - Viet Cong Infrastructure

CURRENT F-6 STRUCTURE



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
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